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Making and Breaking Mathematical Sense 
 
A popular philosophical problem mathematics students sometimes puzzle over is whether 
mathematics is discovered or invented. These options are not binary opposites, of course, and 
answers may vary depending on which parts of mathematics are considered and how the terms 
are defined. Classical foundational programs take different sides on this, but in doing so they all 
focus on the reality of the objects, properties, and relations studied in mathematics, on the truth 
character of mathematical statements made about them, and on how we humans can come to 
know these things. Such ontological and epistemological issues, according to Roi Wagner 
in Making and Breaking Mathematical Sense: Histories and Philosophies of Mathematical 
Practice, are both too narrow and too static; they should not be our central concern as we reflect 
on the nature and practice of mathematics. 
Wagner, like a number of others over the past few decades, is far more interested in how 
mathematics is actually produced, accepted, and applied (its social construction) than in how it 
can be conceptualized as a finished body of knowledge (its essential nature). In particular, he is 
keenly committed to exploring the shifting meaning of mathematical textual material as it 
undergoes development and transformation by human actors embedded in different cultural and 
intellectual settings. Wagner intentionally adopts a post-structural stance on the practice of 
mathematics: what is important is not some stable theoretically organized formal outcome, but 
the ways in which mathematical notions and notations obtain and change sense (semiosis) as 
they get formulated, used, and communicated. “Meaning,” he says elsewhere (in Post-Structural 
Readings of Gödel’s Proof), “is an operator which produces difference across repetition.” 
This sort of postmodern perspective first came to prominence in literary circles, but it is now 
(and here) also making inroads in contemporary philosophy of mathematics. Readers unfamiliar 
with (or antagonistic to) this polemical point of view and its often perplexing dialect may be put 
off by some parts of this book, but Wagner makes a concerted effort to limit technical jargon and 
to restrict denser philosophical discussions to particular chapters that can be skimmed or omitted 
without losing the overall gist of his argument. In fact, Wagner mostly writes with a clarity and 
an engaging style that pulls his reader along as he makes a case for his maverick approach. 
As the book’s subtitle indicates, this work treats both history and philosophy of mathematics. 
Ambitious as this goal is, it is more as well, because Wagner develops his philosophical position 
partly through dialogue with contemporary theories of cognition. The main thrust of his 
argument, however — that mathematics is replete with shifting interconnected meanings and 
ambiguities that aren’t adequately captured by the formalized systems that abstract from them — 
is amply illustrated via well-documented historical case studies. 
Wagner begins by critically testing classical philosophies of mathematics (empiricism, Platonic 
realism, logicism, intuitionism, formalism, logical positivism) vis-à-vis certain issues arising 
from mathematical practice. Standard foundational approaches, for instance, take little notice of 
the different ways in which mathematicians have responded to “monsters” (e.g., 
incommensurables, infinitesimals) that challenged established ways of doing mathematics; such 
philosophies presuppose a polished product where these have already been barred or tamed. 
Rather than choose from among the various foundational approaches, Wagner sees them as 
fixating on aspects of mathematical practice that tell only part of the story. 
His alternative vision is for a “constraints-based philosophy of mathematics: instead of debating 
the reality of mathematical entities, we will think of mathematics as a field of knowledge that 
negotiates various kinds of real constraints.” These include various social constraints but also 
methodological constraints that promote consensus, such as the formalizability of results and 
validity of proofs, along with more intangible controls such as perceived relevance and depth. 
Such a philosophy acknowledges and celebrates the interpretative fluidity and richness of 
meaning witnessed in mathematical practice. It thus aligns mathematics in certain ways with the 
humanities and social sciences as well as with natural science and analytic philosophy. 
Wagner devotes two of his seven chapters to analyzing episodes in the history of mathematics. 
Chapter 2 explores some fascinating recent work by Jens Høyrup, Albrecht Heefer, and Wagner 
himself on two significant advances in Renaissance algebra: how the notion of and notation for 
algebraic unknowns and variables arose from various mercantile practices involving quantity 
purchases and currency exchanges; and how the idea of negative numbers and their complex 
roots gradually evolved from the formal arithmetic of binomials involving subtracted quantities 
and the notion of debts. These developments demonstrate the use of multiple and shifting 
meanings, moving both from one domain to another (business transactions to mathematics) and 
within a given domain (algebra). 
Chapter 4 continues to expound on the theme of semiosis, this time through contemporary 
examples of mathematical practice. His first case study considers the various senses of the 
“paradigmatic mathematical sign, x,” as used in developing the theory of power series: as a 
variable, a transcendental constant, and a placeholder. The role taken by x depends on the 
particular operations and uses being explored for power series, something that often perplexes 
students and that is not typically clarified by textbooks. The second case study looks at 
the Marriage Theorem. Wagner notes that certain developments here during the last half of the 
20th century have some interesting connections to gender role stereotypes. His point here is not 
to assert that the way we use language dictates our mathematical results, but he does say that 
“my goal is to make room for the possibility that language co-constitutes scientific (specifically, 
mathematical) production.” 
Chapter 5 is devoted to discussing contemporary theories of cognition, both “theories of 
elementary number processing” and “more complex theories of mathematical concept 
formation,” which involve mathematical metaphors. This is too complex to summarize briefly. 
Suffice it to say that Wagner identifies difficulties with both sorts of theories, offering instead a 
post-structuralist approach to mathematical cognition by Deleuze — something Wagner says can 
be skipped by readers allergic to postmodern styles of reasoning. 
He carries the theme of mathematical metaphor forward in Chapter 6, however, when he delves 
into two more historical case studies, this time used as test cases for theories of cognition. The 
first of these examines different ways in which the two conceptual domains of geometry and 
algebra are intertwined in four medieval, Renaissance, and early modern works. The transfer of 
knowledge that occurred there between these two domains was varied and complex, once again 
involving entities with plural shifting meanings. His second case study looks at different 
concepts of infinity and infinitesimals, largely countering features of their historical development 
to a particular theory of cognition. 
The concluding chapter provides a counterpoint to his earlier chapter on philosophy of 
mathematics. That one discussed ways in which mathematics develops under various constraints; 
this one investigates “how mathematics changes the reality in which it evolves, feeding back into 
the constraints that shape it.” Wagner’s views here are formed in conversation with the post-
Kantian German philosophers Fichte, Schelling, and Hermann Cohen — “seen today as obscure 
oddities” rather than as prominent philosophers one might expect to turn to for insights on 
mathematics. Wagner values them, however, for what he can learn from their attempts to 
coordinate empirical science with human thinking, ways that differ from current analytical 
approaches to philosophy of mathematics, which seem to him to be at an impasse. Inspired by 
them, Wagner argues that mathematical ideas are designed to fit reality in a general way, but that 
they also shape our interaction with the world around us by being embedded in our technology 
and by providing intellectual tools needed for us to make scientific sense of our experience. This 
being so, it is not all that surprising that mathematics is applicable to the empirical world we 
experience, which provides Wagner with at least a partial response to Wigner’s well-known 
query about the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences.” 
This is a book that tackles a number of big issues on several fronts. Not everyone will agree with 
its point of view, but it nevertheless offers a substantial and interesting treatment of issues in the 
philosophy of mathematical practice. It does this in part via well-reasoned case studies in the 
history of mathematics. This combination of history and philosophy of mathematics addresses a 
pithy criticism about science, which I will paraphrase here: “history of mathematics without 
philosophy of mathematics is blind, while philosophy of mathematics without history of 
mathematics is lame.” Readers will have to judge for themselves how well this book sees and 
walks. I, for one, very much appreciated the interactive exposition. This book expands the 
discourse on philosophy of mathematical practice using informed specifics from history of 
mathematics, making it a worthwhile addition for academic libraries and historians and 
philosophers of mathematics. 
 
